由博斯科撰稿，刊登於洛杉磯時報「是直談傾台時刻」(It’s time for straight talk that favors Taiwan)的專文，是一篇正確解讀美國最新對台政策的指引，值得再三細讀深思。
當美國政府，已經開放要明確放棄戰略模糊政策，要具體面對台灣主體的時候，在全球海內外的台灣人，我們是否也應該務實地來檢視，長年來我們在中華民國流亡政府體制下，苟且偷安的悲慘歲月。掌握新時代的動脈，讓我們有效地凝聚，台灣人的智慧，來終結流亡政府施加予我的政治煉獄，讓我們攜手迎向嶄新的國際舞台。台灣人加油！加油！加油！
Joseph A. Bosco: It’s time for straight talk that favors Taiwan
約瑟夫 · A.博斯科： 是直談傾臺的時候
譯者：謝鎮寬 08/25/2010
約瑟夫 · A.博斯科發佈： 2010 年 08月 24 日12: 01: 00 AM CDT
1995 年 8 月，1996 年 3 月中國發射導彈，穿過台灣海峽，關閉了台灣對國際的商務。
在這兩個場合克林頓總統，派出航空母艦第一次直接通過臺灣海峽，阻止赤化升級。 中國譴責這“侵犯”了它的主權（就像它現在反對美韓計畫在黃海的海軍演習)，並威脅當戰鬥群下次進入海峽時，將侍以火海。
艦隊停留、 迫使中國停止發射導彈，危機隨之解除。
這是當時情況。
讓我們把時間快轉到，剛剛才公佈的國防部評估，提到中國持續擴軍，和它可能對臺灣、南中國海及其他地區的領土要求採取行動。
反西方的敵意和毛主席當年的狂妄，重新燃起美國要“遏制”和“圍堵”中國。 但現在這個不滿和憎恨，其背後卻是西方，幫中國所建構的經濟和軍事實力。
美國國防部長羅伯特蓋茲質疑，北京挑釁國際準則的做法。 而參謀聯席會議主席邁克爾穆倫最近指稱：“我已經從好奇中國人正在對什麼，轉為關心他們正在做什麼”。
國務卿希拉蕊克林頓正確地警告北京，不要切斷在南海的航行自由。 歐巴馬政府擔憂，北京自我界定西藏和臺灣為其“核心利益”，如果不予挑明，那可能激發危險的中國冒進主義。
然而，針對臺灣閃點，歐巴馬總統團隊不明智地，追隨自尼克森以來每屆政府的“戰略模糊”政策。
根據該項政策，華盛頓定期出售臺北武器，面對中國壓倒性攻擊，只能做最起碼的自我防衛。 不過，華盛頓並沒有承諾美國是要干預，或不干預。 我們依賴美國的不確定，來制肘北京。
1990 年代中期的導彈事件，是自韓戰以來，美國和中國最接近的公開衝突。
在那時，中國軍事官員問助理國務卿約瑟夫奈伊，如果中國攻台美國將如何回應。
他回答說：“我們不知道，你不知道。 它將視情況而定”。
美國官員始終重複那句口頭語，儘管中國將領兩次提到，一旦美國協防台灣，可能導致攻擊美國本土的核子戰爭。
除了嚴厲的措詞，中國進一步增添更多潛艇，和可以擊沉巡防在台灣附近航空母艦的反艦導彈，以佈署未來的臺灣衝突。 國防部的2010年四年國防評估，確認美國規劃策略複雜化的成功。
這兩個國家正在準備，一個有活力來典型避免和反避免、一場可能因相互錯估而導致災難的戰爭。
北京和華盛頓都不想戰爭，但只要中國認為，美國最終會放棄民主臺灣來避免戰爭，那衝突的危險就會增加。現在該是美國對臺灣清晰表態的時候；戰略模糊已經過時了。
華盛頓應聲明，對任何中國的攻擊或恫嚇，我們都將捍衛民主臺灣，而且我們也歡迎臺灣參與國際組織（從邀請馬英九總統出席12 月，於檀香山舉行的亞太經濟合作組織會議開始）。
相對的，臺灣必須在現階段放棄正式獨立，即使該結果最終是符合美國的價值觀。
為要求中國放棄武力，華府也必須保證不承認臺灣的正式國家地位，和不鼓勵別人如此做，同時也堅持一旦中國動武，將引發立即承認。
最後，〈希拉蕊〉克林頓應該重新考慮，她不願意挑戰令人遺憾的中國人權記錄。 支持中國民主的原則立場，是解決兩岸長期難題的最好辦法。 兩個民主化人民，可以和平處理統一、 獨立或聯合的議題。如果沒有長久的中國共產黨問題，就不會有棘手的臺灣問題。
約瑟夫博斯科，美國國家安全顧問，任教於喬治城外交學院台美中關係。 他曾任國防部長辦公室亞太安全事務中國桌專員。 他為洛杉磯時報寫這篇專欄。
Joseph A. Bosco: It’s time for straight talk that favors Taiwan
By Joseph A. Bosco
Posted: 08/24/2010 12:01:00 AM CDT
In August 1995 and March 1996, China fired missiles across theTaiwan Strait, closing it to international commerce.
On both occasions, President Clinton sent aircraft carriers to deter Chinese escalation, the first time directly through the Taiwan Strait. China condemned this "violation" of its sovereignty (just as it now objects to planned U.S.-South Korea naval exercises in the Yellow Sea) and threatened "a sea of fire" for the next battle group entering thestrait.
The ships stayed out, China stopped firing missiles, and the crisis dissipated.
That time.
Fast-forward to a just-released Defense Department assessment that describes China’s continuing military buildup and its potential to enforce territorial claims on Taiwan, in the South China Sea and elsewhere in theregion.
The anti-Western hostility and paranoia of Chairman Mao’s years have resurfaced in fresh charges of U.S. "containment" and "encirclement" of China. But now that sense of grievance and resentment is backed by the massive economic and military power the West helped China build.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has openly questioned Beijing’s defiant approach to international norms. And Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently stated: "I have moved from being curious about what (the Chinese) are doing to being concerned about what they are doing."
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton correctly warned Beijing against cutting off freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The Obama administration worries that Beijing is defining its claims there as "core interests" on a par with Tibet and Taiwan, and if unchallenged, that could lead todangerous Chinese adventurism.
Yet, on the Taiwan flash point, President Obama’s team has unwisely perpetuated the policy of "strategic ambiguity" followed by every administration since Richard Nixon’s.
Under that policy, Washington periodically sells Taipei weapons for minimal self-defense against an overwhelming Chinese attack. But Washington does not commit the United States to intervene, or not to intervene. We rely on American unpredictability to stay Beijing’s hand.
The missile incidents of the mid-1990s were the closest the U.S. and China had come to open conflict since the Korean War.
At the time, Chinese military officials asked Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Nye how the United States would respond if China were to attack Taiwan.
He replied: "We don’t know and you don’t know. It would depend on the circumstances."
U.S. officials have repeated that mantra ever since, while Chinese generals have twice suggested that a U.S. defense of Taiwan could result innuclear war reaching the American mainland.
Beyond harsh rhetoric, China further shaped the circumstances for a future Taiwan confrontation by acquiring more submarines and anti-ship missiles that could sink an aircraft carrier steaming anywhere near Taiwan. The Defense Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review confirms the strategy’s success in complicating U.S. planning.
Both countries now prepare for war in a classic deterrence/counter-deterrence dynamic, a formula for catastrophic mutual miscalculation.
Neither Beijing nor Washington wants war, but as long as China believes the United States will ultimately abandon democratic Taiwan to avoidit, the danger of conflict increases.
It is time for U.S. clarity on Taiwan; strategic ambiguity has run its course.
Washington should declare that we would defend democratic Taiwan against any Chinese attack or coercion, and that we also welcome Taiwan’s participation in international organizations (starting by inviting President MaYing-jeou to Honolulu for the December meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group).
In return, Taiwan must forgo formal independence for now, even though that result is ultimately consistent with American values.
In exchange for China’s renouncing force, Washington should also pledge not to recognize formal Taiwan statehood and discourage others from doing so, while also insisting that China’s use of force would trigger instant recognition.
Finally, Clinton should reconsider her reluctance to challenge China’s sorry human rights record. A more principled stand in support of Chinese democracy is the best long-term solution to the cross-strait conundrum. Two democratic peoples could peacefully manage the question of unification, independence or association. There would be no intractable Taiwan problem if there were no enduring Communist China problem.
Joseph A. Bosco, a national security consultant, specialized in China-Taiwan-U.S. relations at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. He worked for the China desk in Asia-Pacific Security Affairs at the office of the secretary of Defense. He wrote this column for the Los Angeles Times.
